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ARGUMENT 
In order for the University of Utah to prevail on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
12(b)(6), the university must show to a certainty that Webb would not be entitled to relief 
under any set of facts that could be proved in support of his claims. See Prows v. State. 822 
P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). Webb satisfied his obligation under Utah's liberal notice 
pleading to state a claim for relief by alleging negligence. 
The University of Utah argues, however, that Webb, and all other university students, 
can never make a claim against the university for negligence because the university does not 
have a special relationship with its students. Thus, it argues, it is immune from liability for 
its negligent conduct. 
The University of Utah simply misunderstands Webb's position and misunderstands 
basic tort law. Webb has argued from the beginning that its negligence claim against the 
University of Utah was based on the University of Utah's failure to exercise reasonable care 
when directing and assigning Webb to participate in a dangerous activity; a claim based on 
malfeasance. Webb's complaint alleges that the University of Utah was negligent for "taking 
the class into a dangerous area." The word "taking" denotes a particular action undertaken 
by the University of Utah. Thus, Webb alleged that the University of Utah's affirmative act 
of directing students to participate in a dangerous activity constitutes negligence and was the 
cause of his injuries. 
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A review of basic tort principles will clear up much of the confusion caused by the 
University of Utah's reference to a "special relationship" and show why the University of 
Utah owed a duty of care to Webb and why Beach v. Universitv of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1986) is inapplicable. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies two types of conduct which lead to 
negligence, malfeasance and nonfeasance. Section 284 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
is entitled, "Negligent Conduct; Act or Failure to Act," and states, 
Negligent conduct may be either 
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as 
involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, 
or 
(b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or 
assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (emphasis added). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines those situations where a duty is owed 
when a claim is made for malfeasance or nonfeasance: 
Conduct which is negligent in character does not result in liability unless there 
is a duty owed by the actor to the other not to be negligent. Normally, where 
there is an affirmative act which affects the interests of another, there is a 
duty not to be negligent with the respect to the doing of the act. On the other 
hand, where the negligence of the actor consists in a failure to act for the 
protection or assistance of another, there is normally no liability unless some 
relation between the actor and the other . . . has created a duty to act for the 
other's protection or assistance. 
The essential difference between the two situations is that in the first the other 
is positively injured by the actor's affirmative action, while in the latter he 
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merely fails to receive the benefit which he would receive if the actor had 
taken the action necessary for his protection or assistance. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, topic 4 (emphasis added). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts separately addresses malfeasance and 
nonfeasance. Under malfeasance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that a person who 
engages in an affirmative act must do so with reasonable care (§ 298), with reasonable 
competence (§ 299), with reasonable preparation (§ 300), with reasonable warning (§ 301), 
without unreasonable risk of direct or indirect harm (§ 302), etc. 
Under nonfeasance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the general rule that a 
person does not owe a duty to render aid or protect another. For example, a person does not 
owe a duty to help a person who is drowning or is in other need of assistance. However, 
comment c to section 314 notes, "Liability for non-feasance is largely confined to situations 
in which there was some special relationship between the parties, on the basis of which the 
defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid of plaintiff." Sections 314A-
320 identify situations giving rise to special relationships and liability for nonfeasance. 
Utah law is in accord with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. "In cases where the 
alleged negligence consists of a failure to act, the person injured by another's inaction must 
demonstrate the existence of some special relationship between the parties creating a duty 
on the part of the latter to exercise such due care in behalf of the former." See DCR Inc. v. 
Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 983). The Utah Supreme Court noted that 
"[relationships which give rise to such a duty include those between carriers and passengers, 
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employers and employees, owners and invitees, and parents and children." Id. The Court 
then went on to hold that contractual relationships give rise to a special relationship and a 
duty to act. See id. 
To determine whether the special relationship cases are even applicable, the Court 
must first determine whether Webb's claim of negligence against the University of Utah was 
based on an allegation of malfeasance or nonfeasance. Webb's complaint alleges that the 
University of Utah was negligent for "taking the class into a dangerous area." The word 
"taking" denotes a particular action undertaken by the University of Utah. Webb did not 
allege that the University of Utah failed to render aid to him or protect him. Thus, Webb's 
claim of negligence against the University of Utah is based on malfeasance and not 
nonfeasance. 
Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) is inapplicable because it 
discusses a claim based on nonfeasance. Beach merely sets forth the basic common law rule 
that negligent conduct arising from nonfeasance is only actionable after a finding of a special 
relationship. 
The University of Utah incorrectly argues that the finding of a special relationship is 
always necessary when a claim of negligence is brought against any governmental entity. 
The requirement of finding a special relationship is only necessary when a claim of 
negligence is based on nonfeasance as opposed to malfeasance. In fact, the traditional 
special relationships which give rise to a duty to render aid or protect another involve 
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relationships between non-governmental entities and individuals, i.e., landowner-invitee, 
master-servant, innkeeper-guest, carriers and passengers, and parents and children. 
The cases cited by the University of Utah which supports its assertion that a special 
relationship is necessary when a claim of negligence is brought against a governmental entity 
each involve a claim of nonfeasance. Ferre v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) was based 
on a nonfeasance claim of failure to supervise a former inmate who was assigned to a 
halfway house. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993) involved a nonfeasance claim 
of failure to supervise a parolee. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 
involved a nonfeasance claim of failure of the county to protect plaintiff from a mental 
patient. Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) involved a 
nonfeasance claim of failure to assist pedestrians across the street. Each of these cases 
required a finding of a special relationship because they each involved a claim of 
nonfeasance. 
In cases grounded in malfeasance, there is a duty not to be negligent in undertaking 
an affirmative act which affects the interests of another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, topic 4. The court cases which analyze claims by students against universities draw 
a distinction between claims which arise from activities which occur during class and those 
arising from activities which occur after class. The distinction between in-class and after-
class cases really boils down to a distinction between claims of malfeasance and 
nonfeasance. Those cases where a student was injured during class have been claims of 
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malfeasance: negligent instruction and assignment. Those cases where a student was injured 
after-class have been claims of nonfeasance: failure to protect or supervise. 
The Florida Supreme Court stated the well-settled tort principle regarding malfeasance 
and discussed its application to a university: 
it is clearly established that one who undertakes to act. . . thereby becomes 
obligated to act with reasonable care. . . . There is no reason why a university 
may act without regard to the consequences of its actions while every other 
legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent person would in like 
or similar circumstances. 
Nova Southeastern Univ. Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86, 89 (Fla. 2000). 
Webb's claim against the University of Utah is based on malfeasance. Under well-
settled tort law, the University of Utah owed a duty to act with reasonable care when 
rendering services to its students. The duty is owed to all of those whose interests may be 




For the reasons set forth above, Webb respectfully requests that the trial court's Order 
of Dismissal be reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Dated this 23rd day of July, 2003. 
DRIGGS, BILLS & DAY, P.C. 
Brent Gordon 
Attorney for Appellant and Plaintiff 
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